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JUSTICE SCALIA, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE, AND CHRISTIAN PRIVILEGE
Caroline Mala Corbin*
INTRODUCTION

Justice Scalia had an unusual take on the Establishment
Clause. From its earliest Establishment Clause cases, the
Supreme Court has held that the Clause forbids the government
from first, favoring one or some religions over others, and
second, favoring religion over secular counterparts.' Although
Justice Scalia was not alone in questioning the second principle,
he was uniquely vehement in challenging the first. In particular,
he maintained that given the history and traditions of this
country, the government could, consistent with the Constitution,
express a preference for Christianity. Moreover, he tended to
dismiss the idea that favoring one religion would undermine a
main goal of the Establishment Clause, which is to protect
religious minorities. Instead, he thought that the government's
failure to favor Christianity expressed hostility to religion.
I want to suggest that Justice Scalia's view of the
Establishment Clause exemplifies Christian privilege. In this
analysis, I borrow from critical race studies and its analysis of
white privilege. I do not mean to equate race and religion, which
are obviously different and have very different histories in the
United States. (Of course, they are not completely distinct either,
as race and religion often overlap and intersect.) 2 Rather, I argue
that insights from critical race studies can help illuminate Justice
Scalia's relationship with the Establishment Clause.
*Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank Jean
Phillip Shami for research assistance as well as the staff of the FirstAmendment Law
Review for the invitation to their wonderful symposium..
1See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A ConstitutionalHierarchyofReligions?Justice Scalia, the
Ten Commandments, and the Future ofthe Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U.L. REv.
1097, 1113 (2006) ("The principle of governmental neutrality among religions and
between religion and nonreligion has been a central tenet of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for more than half a century [] in essence, from
the very beginning.").
2For example, because most Muslims in the United States are not white, hostility
towards Muslims may have a racial component. See, e.g., Section 1: A Demographic
PortraitofMuslim Americans, PEw RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/section-1-a-demographic-portrait-ofmuslim-americans/ (finding that only 30% of U.S. Muslims identify as white).
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Part I presents Justice Scalia's view of the Establishment
Clause. Part II explores white privilege and white fragility and
identifies three key insights. First, whites enjoy certain unearned
privileges, including the fact that whiteness is the unstated racial
norm. Second, these privileges are often invisible to those who
possess them. Third, the loss of this privileged position is often
experienced as hostility. Part III maps these insights onto Justice
Scalia's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as well as his
originalist theory of constitutional interpretation more generally.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

In one of its early Establishment Clause cases, the
Supreme Court explained that the Establishment Clause bars the
government from favoring one religion over another, and from
favoring religion over its secular counterpart: "[T]he First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." 3 These
principles have been regularly reinforced in Establishment
Clause decisions over the years.'
Justice Scalia disagreed with both. He repeatedly argued
that the Establishment Clause does not bar the state from
preferring religion over nonreligion. Thus, he proclaimed that
"there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion

3 Epperson

v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) ("The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that
the 'First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion."').
4 See, e.g., McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 860 ("[T]he 'First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion."); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
703 (1994) ("[A] principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause [is] that
government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion."); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609-10 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Forty-five years
ago, this Court announced a basic principle of constitutional law from which it has
not strayed: the Establishment Clause forbids not only state practices that 'aid one
religion . . . or prefer one religion over another,' but also those that 'aid all
religions.'"); id. at 627 ("While the Establishment Clause's concept of neutrality is
not self-revealing, our recent cases have invested it with specific content: the State
may not favor or endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or one religion
over others.").
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generally"' and that "the Court's oft repeated assertion that the
government cannot favor religious practice is false."I
On this question, Justice Scalia was not alone.' Chief
Justice Rehnquist, for example, argued that the Founders never
expressed concern about whether the federal government might
aid all religions evenhandedly.' In fact, in religion clause
scholarship, whether religion is special and merits special
treatment is a perennial debate.'
However, the disagreement about whether it is
unconstitutional to favor all religions does not extend to the
question of whether the Establishment Clause permits favoring
one or some religions over others. On that score, there is much
less dispute. The same Supreme Court case that incorporated the
Establishment Clause also held that "[t]he 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws
which . . prefer one religion over another.""o This proposition
has been acknowledged in most Establishment Clause decisions

'Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia then lists
numerous examples of historical religious practices and concludes: "With all of this
reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Courtpossibly assert that
the 'First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between . .. religion and
nonreligion,' and that '[mlanifesting a purpose to favor . . adherence to religion
generally,' is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words of the
Constitution. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society's constant
understanding of those words." Id at 889 (internal citations omitted).
Justice Thomas has his own idiosyncratic views. He maintains that the
Establishment Clause does not apply to the states and therefore cannot serve as a
limit on their religious activities. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Gallaway, 134 S. Ct
1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("As I have explained
before, the text and history of the [Establishment] Clause 'resis[t] incorporation'
against the States .... If the Establishment Clause is not incorporated, then it has no
application here, where only municipal action is at issue.").
'Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' Compare Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fairto Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REv. 571 (2006), and Michael W. McConnell, The Problem ofSingling Out
Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000), with Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence
G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasisforProtectingReligious
Conduct, 61 U. CI. L. REv. 1245 (1994), and Micah Schwartzman, WhatlfReligion Is
Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 1351, 1365 (2012).
10 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).

188

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

since then." Typical is Larson v. Valente,12 which states
unequivocally: "The clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another." 1 3
Even when upholding programs and practices that have
the effect of favoring some religions over others, the Supreme
Court justifies that benefit as indirect or unintentional. Thus, a
voucher program in which over 96% of government funds ended
up at (mostly Catholic) religious schoolsl4 did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it was the parents, not the
government, that chose where to direct the money." A legislative
prayer program where the vast majority of invited chaplains gave
Christian prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause
because almost all the town's congregations were Christian and
no one was intentionally excluded." Meanwhile, the Court
permitted Texas to display a Ten Commandments monolith on
the State Capitol grounds despite its undeniably religious
content 7 because the Court maintained that the government's
aims were historical, not religious." In other words, despite some
questionable holdings, the Court has generally insisted that the

" See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("It is part of our
settled jurisprudence that 'the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on
religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization."');
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989) ("Whatever else the
Establishment Clause may mean . .. it certainly means at the very least that
government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed . .
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
1Id. at 244.
14 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 681 (2002) ("96 percent of students in
the program attend religious schools.").
15
See id. at 646.
16 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014) ("Although most of the
prayer givers were Christian, this fact reflected only the predominantly Christian
identity of the town's congregations, rather than an official policy or practice of
discriminating against minority faiths."); id. at 1831 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring)
(conceding that that intentionally discriminating against minority religions would
violate the Establishment Clause).
17 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) ("Of course, the Ten
Commandments are religious-they were so viewed at their inception and so
remain.").
s Id. at 689 (finding that display of Ten Commandments meant to acknowledge "the
role the Decalogue plays in America's heritage ...
.").
12

13
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government cannot intentionally favor or advance particular
faiths. 19

Justice Scalia, however, disagreed. As far as Justice Scalia
was concerned, the principle that the government can never
favor one religion over another is "demonstrably false." 20
Granted, sometimes the government may not single out a
religion for special favor, such as cases involving government
funding.2 1 Indeed, in one dissent Justice Scalia even wrote that
"I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with
the view, that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of
one religion over others." 2 2 But when it comes to the state
revering God or the Ten Commandments, the Establishment
Clause is no bar. "[T]here is nothing unconstitutional in a State[]
. . honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment,
or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments." 23 On the contrary, preferring Christianity (or
perhaps Judeo-Christianity) is inevitable:
If religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in
the public forum at all. One cannot say the word
"God," or "the Almighty," one cannot offer
public supplication or thanksgiving, without
contradicting the beliefs of some people that there
are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no
attention to human affairs. With respect to public
acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely
clear from our Nation's historical practices that
the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of

19 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824 (noting that a pattern of prayers that proselytized
Christianity or denigrated other religions would be unconstitutional).
20 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
("Besides appealing to the demonstrably false principle that the government cannot
favor religion over irreligion, today's opinion suggests that the posting of the Ten
Commandments violates the principle that the government cannot favor one religion
over another.").
21 See id. at 893 ("[The Establishment Clause bars preferring one religion over others]
is indeed a valid principle where public aid or assistance to religion is concerned . ..
or where the free exercise of religion is at issue . . . but it necessarily applies in a
more limited sense to public acknowledgment of the Creator.") (citations omitted).
22 Bd. of Educ. ofKiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities,
just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.2 4
In short, the government cannot thank God without favoring
some religions, and therefore it cannot avoid disregarding
"polytheists," "believers in unconcerned deities," "devout
atheists," and anyone else who does not share a belief in the
Judeo-Christian God.2 5
As to whether the Establishment Clause allows the state
to honor God in the first place, Justice Scalia's answer is clear:
of course it does, because these acknowledgements, and this type
of favoritism, dates to the founding of our country. According to
Justice Scalia, "the meaning of the [Establishment] Clause is to
be determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings. "26 Thus, the touchstone for the Establishment
Clause is the country's history-"our interpretation of the
Establishment Clause should compor[t] with what history
reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its
guarantees" 27 -and
traditions-"[t]he foremost principle I
would apply is fidelity to the longstanding traditions of our

people. "28
This approach reflects the originalist theory of
constitutional interpretation Justice Scalia espoused. In a
nutshell, originalists believe we should understand the
Constitution in the same way as the founding generation, and if
they thought a government action was constitutional, then so

McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 91-96, 116-121 and accompanying text (describing how "JudeoChristian" is often really just Christian).
26 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe
Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the '[g]overnment policies of
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted
part of our political and cultural heritage.' . . . [T]he meaning of the Clause is to be
determined by reference to historical practices and understandings.").
27 Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
688, 673 (1984)); id. at 631 ("[A] test for implementing the protections of the
Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate
longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.") (quoting Cty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)).
28 Bd. ofEduc. ofKiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 ("I would prefer to reach the same result by adoptin
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation's past and
present practices .... ).
24
25
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should we.2 9 In other words, as Justice Scalia has written, "the
line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.""
Proponents argue that originalism is more democratic
because it ensures that the meaning of the Constitution is
determined by the supermajority that approved the Constitution
rather than nine unelected judges." They also claim that by
forcing judges to uncover the objective, fixed meaning of the
Constitution, originalism prevents judges from infusing it with
their own personal views.3 2 As Scalia argued: "[O]ur Nation's
protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot
possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of
the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the
historic practices of our people.""
Justice Scalia's view of the Establishment Clause, which
is itself a reflection of his originalist theory of constitutional
interpretation, reflects a certain privileged viewpoint. More
particularly, both at a general (originalism) and a specific (the
Establishment Clause allows state preference for Judeo-

29

Erwin Chemerinsky, The JurisprudenceofJustice Scalia:A CriticalAppraisal, 22 U.

HAW. L. REv. 385 (2000) ("Justice Scalia's unique contribution to constitutional
theory has been his jurisprudence of 'original meaning.' His central idea is that the
meaning of the Constitution is fixed and that it is discoverable by looking at the text
and the practices at the time the Constitution was written.").
30 Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963)). Justice Scalia later clarified that original or
public meaning equates to the founding generation's understanding and not the
founding framers' intent. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 390 (quoting
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW

38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)) ("What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what
I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original
draftsmen intended."); see also Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism,69 Orno
ST. L.J. 609, 609-11 (2008) (comparing "old originalism" and "new originalism").
Either way, the understanding dates to the founding era.
31 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, "Active Liberty" and JudicialPower: What Should Courts Do to

PromoteDemocracy?Active Liberty: Interpreting Our DemocraticConstitution by Stephen

Breyer, 100 Nw. U.L. REv. 1827, 1859 (2006) ("[T]he original meaning version of
originalism ha[s] the virtue of supermajority endorsement, which makes it more
likely that [it is] the product of broad democratic participation.").
32 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The LesserEvil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 863 (1989)
("Now the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution-or, for that
matter, in judicial interpretation of any law-is that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law.").
33 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Christianity) level, it is one made possible by white/Christian
privilege.
II. PRIVILEGE DEFINED
Among the first to explore white privilege was Peggy
McIntosh in her essay, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible
Knapsack.34 She describes white privilege as "an invisible package
of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but
about which I was 'meant' to remain oblivious."" Others have
observed that white privilege "is best described as myriad
advantages that White people enjoy on a daily basis that racial
minorities do not."3 6
This Part highlights three key characteristics of white
privilege. First, among the many unearned advantages that
whites enjoy is that whiteness and white experience is the
unstated norm. Second, these privileges are often invisible to
those who benefit from them. Third, white privilege tends to
breed white fragility. Consequently, attempts to change the
status quo to a more equitable system is often experienced at
hostility by those used to a system of privilege.
A. UnearnedBenefits
In her groundbreaking essay, Peggy McIntosh lists dozens of
concrete examples of white privilege.37 Some of these benefits are
generally positive and should be available to everyone, while

34 Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, in BEYOND
HEROES AND HOLIDAYS 79 (Enid Lee et al. eds., 1998).
35 Id. ("White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions,
maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks."). Cf Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709, 1713 (1993) ("In ways so
embedded that it is rarely apparent, the set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits
that accompany the status of being white have become a valuable asset that whites
sought to protect and that those who passed sought to attain.").
36 Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The HairDilemma: Conform to
MainstreamExpectations or EmphasizeRacial Identity, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
407, 418 (2007).
37 McIntosh, supra note 34, at 79-80.
3 Id. at 81 ("Some, like the expectation that neighbors will be decent to you, or that
your race will not count against you in court, should be the norm in a just society.").
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others are negative and "give license to be ignorant, oblivious,
arrogant and destructive." 3 9 They include:
*
*

*
*

*

"If a traffic cop pulls me over . . I can be sure I haven't
been singled out because of my race." 40
"Whether I use checks, credit cards or cash, I can count
on my skin color not to work against the appearance of
my financial reliability." 4 1
"I can choose blemish cover or bandages in 'flesh' color
and have them more or less match my skin." 42
"I can turn on the television or open to the front page of
the paper and see people of my race widely
represented."43
"When I am told about our national heritage or about
'civilization,' I am shown that people of my color made it
what it is." 44

*

"I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of
persons of color .

.

. without .

.

. any penalty for such

oblivion. "4
All of these are advantages that white people enjoy for no
other reason than their whiteness. 46 They are unearned. White
people are treated differently than people of color for the exact
same behavior. The first example alludes to the well-documented
fact that the police stop non-whites for conduct they ignore in
whites. 47 At the same time, study after study has shown that
Id. ("Others, like the privilege to ignore less powerful people, distort the humanity
of the holders as well as the ignored group.").
40
1Id. at 80.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. ("I can easily buy posters, postcards, picture books, greeting cards, dolls, toys,
and children's magazines featuring people of my race.").
44
Id.
45 Id.
46 Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistenceof White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
245, 246 (2005) ("Peggy McIntosh's widely acknowledged definition of white
privilege emphasizes the benefit that privilege bestows upon the individual holder.").
47 Although African-Americans are obviously not the only minority group, they are
the one most studied. See, e.g., Sharon LeFraniere & Andrew W. Lehrer, The
DisproportionateRisks ofDriving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-drivingblack.html (documenting that police are more likely to stop and use force against
black drivers).
'9
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whites are rated as more accomplished for the exact same
performance, including evaluations based on identical resumes4
and legal writing samples.4 9
In addition, our structures are designed with white people
in mind. "Characteristics of the privileged group define the
societal norm."" As a very mundane example, "flesh" colored
crayons, "nude" stockings, and "invisible" Band-Aids have,
until very recently, only met their vaunted criteria for white
people. More generally, the white experience and the white
perspective is the default one. This unstated norm informs our
history, our culture, our politics, and even our holidays." U.S.
history classes, as McIntosh points out, are often the history of
white Americans.52 If you turn on the TV, open the newspaper,
or buy a children's book, you encounter the stories of white
people." "Everywhere we look, we see our own racial image
reflected back to us-in our heroes and heroines, in standards of
beauty,... in our textbooks and historical memory, in the media,
See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha andJamal?A Field Experiment on LaborMarket Discrimination,
94 Am. ECON. REV. 991, 997-98 (2004) (finding that resumes with African-American
names are fifty percent less likely to receive callback interviews than identical ones
with white names).
49 Debra Cassens Weiss, Partnersin Study Gave Legal Memo a Lower Rating When Told
Author Wasn't White, ABA J. (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/hypothetical legal memo demonstrates
unconscious biases. These are just the tip of the iceberg. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins
& G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in CorporateLaw Firms? An
InstitutionalAnalysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 509 (1996) ("As study after study
demonstrates, there are still a substantial number of whites who hold (consciously or
unconsciously) discriminatory and/or stereotypical views about blacks.").
50 Wildman, supra note 46, at 247; see also Sylvia A. Law, White Privilegeand
Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604 (1999) ("White privilege is the
pervasive, structural, and generally invisible assumption that white people define a
norm and Black people are 'other,' dangerous, and inferior.") (footnote omitted).
51 This is not a complete list, either. For example, people are measured against white
standards as well. See, e.g., Wildman, supra note 46, at 247 (" [I] ndividual members of
society are judged against characteristics held by the privileged.").
52 McIntosh, supra note 34, at 80.
53 See, e.g., Dashka Slater, The Uncomfortable Truth About Children'sBooks, MOTHER
JONES (Sept.-Oct. 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/media/2016/08/diversitychildrens-books-slavery-twitter (noting that within five years, more than half of U.S.
children under five will have a nonwhite parent, yet only 14% of children's books
feature a black, Latino, Asian, or Native American main character); Scott Collins,
More Diversity in Film & TV?New Report Says Women and MinoritiesAre Actually Falling
Behind, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/showtracker/la-et-st-diversity-film-tvucla-report-minorities-20160224-story.html (reporting that although 38% of US
population, people of color only account for 8.1 % of lead actors in scripted broadcast
TV shows).
48

2017]

SCALIA & CHRISTIAN PRIVILEGE

195

in religious iconography including the image of god himself . .
."54 Indeed, how else to explain Columbus Day as a federal
holiday and the elevation of Christopher Columbus as the
"discoverer" of the United States?
Because white norms and values are society's norms and
values, whites may ignore all others. Although people of color
need to understand the dominant white culture, many white
people can go their whole lives without learning about nonwhite
cultures. "Most white people have no experience of a genuine
cultural pluralism, one in which whites' perspectives, behavioral
expectations, and values are not taken to be the standard from
which all other cultural norms deviate." 55
In sum, white privilege attempts to capture the idea that
all kinds of benefits attach to being white, one of which is that
whiteness is the unstated norm in American society.
B. Invisibility

A key component of white privilege is that it is often
invisible to those who benefit from it. White people do not
realize that their whiteness confers benefits,56 including the
benefit of having whiteness as the societal norm: whites tend
"not to think about . .. [how] norms, behaviors, experiences, or
perspectives . . . are white-specific." 57
One result is that white people fail to understand that their
perspective is not the one true objective perspective but one of
many, specifically, a white perspective. "Whites are taught to see
their perspectives as objective and representative of reality.""
Because whites believe their own point of view is universal, they
do not learn other points of view. Instead, "we use ourselves and
our experiences as the reference point for everyone. 'I'm not
followed around in the store by a guard. What makes you think

54

Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility, 3 INT'L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 62 (2011).

Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousnessand the
Requirement ofDiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 979 (1993).

5

This description obviously does not apply to every single white person in the
United States, but it does apply to many.
5 Flagg, supra note 55, at 957. Flagg calls this phenomenon "transparency." Id. I will
use "invisibility" instead since it captures the way it is invisible to most whites.
5 DiAngelo, supra note 54, at 59.
56
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you are?"'5 9 Or, "I'm not offended by that joke, therefore it is not
offensive." 6 0
Another result is that white people are so oblivious to the
privileged position that their race confers that most of the time
they do not even think of themselves as raced."1 Other people
have race. White people just are.62 "The most striking
characteristic of whites' consciousness of whiteness is that most
of the time we don't have any." 63 Barbara Flagg goes so far as to
say that this obliviousness is a "defining characteristic of
whiteness: to be white is not to think about it." 6 4
Perhaps this exercise will demonstrate this phenomenon:
Pick five words to describe yourself. Did you include your race?
"When people are asked to describe themselves in a few words,
Black people invariably note their race and white people almost
never do. Surveys tell us that virtually all Black people notice the
importance of race several times a day."6" This tendency is
widespread. If you are reading a white author's novel, odds are
that descriptions of white people do not include their race, but
descriptions of nonwhite people do. "White people rarely
contemplate the fact of our whiteness-it is the norm, the given.
It is a privilege to not have to think about race.""
In sum, whiteness is such the predominant norm, and the
world is so tailored to the needs and values of white people, that
white people can go through life unaware that whiteness is the
default. Indeed, the world is so normed to whiteness that white
people may not even think of themselves in racial terms. Of

" FRANCES E. KENDALL, UNDERSTANDING WHITE PRIVILEGE 71 (Lee Anne Bell ed.,
2006).
60 I[d.
61 Flagg, supra note 55, at 969 ("[Tlhe white person has an everyday option not to
think of herself in racial terms at all.").
62 Id. at 971 ("Whiteness is the racial norm. In this culture the black person, not the
white, is the one who is different."); see also DiAngelo, supra note 54, at 59 ("White
people are just people. . . . [Yet] people of color, who are never just people but
always most particularly black people, Asian people, etc., can only represent their
own racialized experiences.").
63 Flagg, supra note 55, at
957.
64
d. at 969 ("[T]he white person has an everyday option not to think of herself in
racial terms at all. In fact, whites appear to pursue that option so habitually that it
may be a defining characteristic of whiteness: to be white is not to think about it.").
65 Sylvia A. Law, White PrivilegeandAffirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REv. 603, 604
(1999) (citations omitted).
66 Id. at 604-05 (citations
omitted).
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course, whiteness itself does not need to be invisible in order for
white privileges to be. That is, even white people aware of their
race may not fully understand all the benefits that flow from that
fact, including how whiteness is the default norm. "[W]hite
privilege remains largely unacknowledged. [Consequently,] [t] he
existence of white privilege allows white people of good willmany with antiracist views-to benefit from the privileged white
norms."67
C White Fragility

"White fragility" is the term used to describe how whites
get very upset when their unearned racial advantages are pointed
out, and practically apoplectic when they are taken away. 8
Robin DiAngelo, the academic who coined the phrase, defines it
as "a state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress
becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves." 6 9
For example, a challenge to their objectivity, such as
"[s]uggesting that a white person's viewpoint comes from a
racialized frame of reference "70 can unduly disturb them.
Moreover, changes in the status quo designed to move to greater
equality is experienced as hostile targeting of whites.71
There are different causes of the great distress. One of
them is simply that these issues are new and uncomfortable.
"White people in North America live in a social environment
that protects and insulates them from race-based stress. . . . This
insulated environment of racial privilege builds white
expectations for racial comfort while at the same time lowering
the ability to tolerate racial stress." 7 2 Although people of color
Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, TeachingRace/Teaching
Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindnessto ColorInsight, 86 N.C. L. REv. 635, 645
(2008).
68 Again, this general description does not apply to all white people. See supra note
56. Nonetheless, the intensity with which this generalization is denied might itself
demonstrate white fragility.
6'9 DiAngelo, supra note 54, at 54 (coining the term "White Fragility" in an academic
article).
70
Id. at 57.
71 Cf Rhonesha Byng, Arkansas Town Responds To Controversial "Anti-Racist Is A Code
Word forAnti- White" Sign, HUFF. POST (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.hufFingtonpost.com/2013/11/07/harrison-arkansas-antiracist-codeword-antiwhite n 4227769.html.
72 DiAngelo, supra note
54, at 55.
67
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are used to engaging with racial issues, white people are not.
Thus, they have a hard time with race as a topic of conversation
and are "at a loss for how to respond in constructive ways." 73
Exacerbating this discomfort is the simplistic view of
racism often held by whites. White people tend to equate racism
with intentional, hostile discrimination.7 4 Under this view, race
discrimination always has a bad actor. Whites often simply do
not see the other kinds of discrimination that operate. They are
unaware of the unconscious racism that gives whites a boost in
supposedly objective evaluations. They are unaware of the
structural racism that results in "nude" stockings and Columbus
Day. Remember, because the world is designed around their
norms and needs, whites miss the way the status quo is highly
racialized to their benefit.7 5 "The white person's lived experience,
the fabric of daily life, emphasizes-and minute to minute
recreates-the whiteness of the world. This whiteness is just
normal-'the way things are."'76 Accordingly, when someone
tries to explain to a white person how they benefit from their
race, they feel accused of racial malice. It is as though someone
is equating them with the Ku Klux Klan.7 7 "The good/bad
binary is the fundamental misunderstanding driving white
defensiveness about being connected to racism." 7 8 Because
white people hear an accusation of ill will instead of a
deconstruction of unconscious and structural processes, whites

73

1Id. at 57.
Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems
ofPrivilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 881 (1995) ("Generally whites think of
racism as voluntary, intentional conduct, done by horrible others.").
74

7

See, e.g., Kerry A. Dolan, Why White People Downplay Their IndividualRacial

Privileges, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. Bus. (Aug. 27, 2016),

https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-whites-downplay-their-individualracial-privileges ("Research shows that white Americans, when faced with evidence
of racial privilege, deny that they have benefited personally.").
71 Wildman, supra note 46, at 255.
7 Indeed, I almost used the terms "unconscious discrimination" and "structural
discrimination" instead of "unconscious racism" and "structural racism" in case
some readers' reaction to the word "racism" would generate so much resistance that
they would no longer be open to the idea that all race discrimination is not
intentional and malicious.
Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility:Why It's So Hardto Talk to White PeopleAbout
Racism, THE GOOD MEN PROJECT (Apr. 9, 2015),
7

https://goodmenproject.com/featured-content/white-fragility-why-its-so-hard-totalk-to-white-people-about-racism-twlm/.
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fail to grapple with the fact that even if well-meaning, they
nonetheless benefit from their whiteness.79
One defensive reaction is to position themselves as the
real victims: When finally confronted with discussion of race,
"whites position themselves as victimized, slammed, blamed,
attacked."" At the same time whites exaggerate the harm to
themselves, they minimize the actual harm to others.
Consequently, moving the spotlight back onto whites once again
erases and minimizing non-white experience." "'Erasure' refers
to the practice of collective indifference that renders certain
people and groups invisible . . . [and] describe[s] how
inconvenient people are dismissed, their history, pain and
achievements blotted out." 8 2
Moreover, the combination of elevating white pain and
minimizing non-white pain, until conversations about race are
equated with actual racism, results in a textbook example of a
false equivalency.

.

The language of violence that many whites use to
describe anti-racist endeavors is not without
significance, as it is another example of the way
that White Fragility distorts and perverts reality .
. The history of brutal, extensive, institutionalized
and ongoing violence perpetrated by whites
against people of color-slavery, genocide,
lynching, whipping, forced sterilization and
medical experimentation to mention a fewbecomes profoundly trivialized when whites claim
they don't feel safe or are under attack when in the
rare situation of merely talking about race with
people of color."

George Yancy, Dear White America, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2015),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/dear-white-america/ ("You
may have never used the N-word in your life, you may hate the K.K.K., but that
does not mean that you don't harbor racism and benefit from racism.").
'o DiAngelo, supra note 54, at 64.
7

" John Halstead, The Real Reason White People Say 'All Lives Matter", HUFF. POST

(July 25, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnhalstead/dearfellowwhitepeople b_11109842.html ("'All Lives Matter' is really code for 'White Lives Matter,'
because when white people think about 'all lives,' we automatically think about 'all
white lives.'").
82 Paul Sehgal, Fighting 'Erasure':FirstWords, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016),

http://nyti.ms/1NOCOVQ.
83 DiAngelo, supra note 54, at 65.
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It explains how white people can get more upset by a black
football player peacefully protesting police shootings than by the
police shootings themselves.
This defensiveness reaches even higher levels when
whites are faced not merely with discussions of how race shapes
the status quo but actual attempts to remedy it. In fact, such
efforts can be experienced as undeserved and hostile attacks.
And, to be fair, these are attempts to take something from them,
namely their unearned (and unfair) advantages. But because
whites do not understand them as such, they feel unjustly
targeted. Of course, reframing any move towards equality as an
attack allows whites to resist it, thereby leaving intact the status
quo, along with all their privileges.
III. CIHUSTIAN PRIVILEGE
An exchange during the oral argument for Salazar v.
Buono reflects Justice Scalia's privileged Christian view of the
Establishment Clause. The case involved an eight foot Latin
cross on federal lands." Its defenders argued it was meant to
commemorate soldiers who had died during World War I." The
lower courts held that it violated the Establishment Clause for
the federal government to display an obviously Christian
symbol.87 In response, Congress declared that the cross was "a
national memorial commemorating United States participation
in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that
war;"" barred the use of federal funds to remove the cross; and
transferred to private parties the plot of land on which the cross
stood.89 At one point during the oral argument, Justice Scalia
84

559 U.S. 700 (2010).
Id. at 706-07 (describing size and location of the cross in the Mojave National
Preserve).
8 6 Id.
8 Id. at 709 (describing how Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "a
reasonable observer would perceive a cross on federal land as governmental
endorsement of religion.").
8 d. (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub.L. 107-117, §
8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278).
8' The land deal was actually a land swap where the federal government received a
private plot of land in return. d. at 710 (stating in exchange, the Government was to
receive land elsewhere in the preserve from Henry Sandoz and his wife). The swap
was conditional: "The land-transfer statute provided that the property would revert
84
8
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reacted to the ACLU attorney's characterization of the cross as
a Christian symbol that honors Christian soldiers:
JUSTICE SCALIA: The cross doesn't honor nonChristians who fought in the war? Is that -- is that

MR. ELIASBERG: I believe that's actually
correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Where does it say that?
MR. ELIASBERG: It doesn't say that, but a cross
is the predominant symbol of Christianity and it
signifies that Jesus is the son of God and died to
redeem mankind for our sins, and I believe that's
why the Jewish war veterans -JUSTICE SCALIA: It's erected as a war
memorial. I assume it is erected in honor of all of
the war dead. It's the -- the cross is the -- is the most
common symbol of -- of -- of the resting place of
the dead, and it doesn't seem to me -- what would
you have them erect? A cross -- some
conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you
know, a Moslem half moon and star?
MR. ELIASBERG: Well, Justice Scalia, if I may
go to your first point. The cross is the most
common symbol of the resting place of Christians.
I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a
cross on a tombstone of a Jew.
(Laughter.)
MR. ELIASBERG: So it is the most common
symbol to honor Christians.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think you can leap
from that to the conclusion that the only war dead

to the Government if not maintained 'as a memorial commemorating United States
participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war."' Id.
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that that cross honors are the Christian war dead.
I think that's an outrageous conclusion.90
This exchange illustrates several of the privilege themes
described in Part II, but in the context of religion rather than
race. As discussed in more detail below, it highlights how
Christianity is the unstated norm in the United States and that
this Christian privilege is often invisible precisely because the
Christian perspective is assumed to be the universal perspective.
Furthermore, Christian fragility helps explain the emotional
reaction that greets attempts to point out and remedy this state
of affairs.
A. Privilege: Christianityas UnstatedNorm
Just as whiteness confers unearned benefits, so too does
Christianity. One of those benefits is that society is designed
around Christian norms and needs.9 1 Take the United States
calendar. Many might assume that a Monday-Friday workweek
with a Saturday-Sunday weekend-a weekend that facilitates
Sabbath observance for Christians-is normal, natural, and
universal. It is not. In Israel, the workweek is from Sunday to
Thursday, or mid-Friday, to allow people to prepare Shabbat
dinner on Friday and celebrate the Sabbath on Saturday.
Countries with predominantly Muslim populations have Fridays
off because Friday is the Muslim day of prayer.9 2 Moreover, only

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)
(No. 08-472) [hereinafter Salazar Transcript].
" As I have noted elsewhere, "their Sabbath defines the workweek, their sacred days
define state and national holidays, their morality defines the family and determines
when life begins, belief in their God characterizes patriotism, and invocation of their
God solemnizes, dignifies, and authenticates." Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial
Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1545, 1578-79 (2010). If
the cadence sounds familiar, I was riffing on a famous Catharine MacKinnon
quotation about male privilege: "Men's physiology defines most sports, their health
needs largely define insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies defined
workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and
concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit,
their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability
to get along with each other -their wars and rulerships-defines history, their image
defines god, and their genitals define sex." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (First Harv. Univ. Press paperback ed., 1991).
92 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia Switches Start of Weekendfrom Thursday to Friday, BBC NEWS
(June 23, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23031706 ("Friday remains a
9o
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Christians have their Christmas holiday built into the federal
calendar.9 3 The federal government does not close for the high
holy days of other religions. There is no official day off for Yom
Kippur or Passover (Judaism), or for Eid Al-Fitr and Eid AlAdha (Islam), or for Diwali (Hinduism),9 4 Vesak (Buddhism)9 5
or any other religion's most sacred days.9 6 Moreover, to
paraphrase Peggy McIntosh, "[w]hen I am told about our
national heritage or about 'civilization,' I am shown that people
of my [religion] have made it what it is."9 Indeed, our
expressions of patriotism-our pledge of allegiance9 8 and our
national motto9 9 - both incorporate the Christian (or maybe the
Judeo-Christian) worship of God, and not the beliefs of other
faiths. "o

Christianity was certainly the unstated norm for Justice
Scalia. This is evident in the exchange about the large Latin cross

holiday in Muslim countries because it is a holy day set aside for communal
prayer.").
9 In response to the claim that Christmas is a secular holiday that all Americans
celebrate, I paraphrase Mr. Eliasberg: "I have been in Jewish schools. There is never
a Christmas tree or Santa Clause or reindeer decorating the classroom of a Jewish
school." See SalazarTranscript, supra note 90 ("I have been in Jewish cemeteries.
There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew.").
94 Emanuella Grinberg, Six Things You ShouldKnow About Diwali, CNN (Oct. 26,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/25/travel/diwali-2014/ ("The five-day
celebration of good over evil is as important to Hindus as Christmas is to
Christians").
1 Wesak, BBC (Aug. 21, 2014),
www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/buddhism/holydays/wesak.shtml ("This most
important Buddhist festival is known as either Vesak, Wesak or Buddha Day.").
9 I am focusing on Judaism and Islam in order to emphasize that the American
tradition is really a Christian one, despite attempts to describe it as Judeo-Christian
or Abrahamic to include Judaism and Islam.
" McIntosh, supra note 34, at 80. See also Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility,
and Religion: A Critiqueofthe Privilege That ChristianityHas Enjoyed in the United States,
54 ALA. L. REv. 617, 626 (2003) ("People of Christian faiths are privileged in the
United States in that they are guaranteed that the Supreme Court will open with a
prayer that reflects their faith; that their child will be taught a pledge of allegiance
that adopts their God; that when they look at United States currency they will see a
reaffirmation of their beliefs; that public laws will be written to secure the display of
religious documents in public buildings, including schools, that reflect their beliefs;
that if a judge looks to religious texts to justify a decision that those texts will reflect
their beliefs; that the legislature will open with a prayer reflecting their faith; and that
the president will speak and take an oath of office in terms of their religion.").
" "One nation under God"
" "In God We Trust"
00 Just as the calendar, with its Saturday-Sunday weekend, may at first seem "JudeoChristian" but is really just Christian, so too are other practices designated JudeoChristian. See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text (analyzing Ten
Commandments).
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at issue in Salazar v. Buono. In explaining the Establishment
Clause issue with the monument, counsel for the ACLU pointed
out that the Latin cross is "the predominant symbol of
Christianity.""o' Justice Scalia disagreed, arguing that in the
context of a war memorial, it is instead a burial symbol: "the
most common symbol of... the resting place of the dead." 102 As
far as Justice Scalia was concerned, this was the normal way to
mark the dead. But while Christians may equate the Latin cross
with respectful honoring of the dead, that is a Christian practice,
not a universal one. As the ACLU attorney rebutted, "[t]he cross
is the most common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I
have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a
tombstone of a Jew." 1 03
Moreover, Christianity not only served as Justice Scalia's
unstated norm for burial practices, but Christianity (or
monotheistic religions like Christianity) served as Justice Scalia's
unstated norm for religion itself. For example, Justice Scalia
defined "sectarian" through a Christian lens. Justice Scalia
recognized that government endorsement of religion cannot be
sectarian: "And I will further concede that our constitutional
tradition, from the Declaration of Independence and the first
inaugural address of Washington, quoted earlier, down to the
present day, has, with a few aberrations, ruled out of order
government-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the
endorsement is sectarian." 104 But he then defined sectarian to
mean preferring some God-centered faiths over others. Thus, the
quotation ends: "[sectarian] in the sense of specifying details
upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ
(for example, the divinity of Christ)."10 It is as if, for Justice
Scalia, the universe of religions were limited to those that believe
in God.106 Consequently, state-sponsored prayers to God are
See SalazarTranscript,supra note 90, at 38-39.
Id.
103 Id.
104 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id.
106 Obviously, there are many religions that do not worship a God. See Caroline Mala
Corbin, CeremonialDeism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REv.
1545, 1575 (2010) ("Many Hindus, for example, envision three main manifestations
of the Divine-Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva. Many Buddhists, on the other hand, do
101
102
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nonsectarian and perfectly constitutional, even in public
schools. 107
Moreover, because he equated "religion" to monotheistic
religions like Christianity, Justice Scalia could argue that prayers
to God were unifying:
I must add one final observation: The Founders of
our Republic knew the fearsome potential of
sectarian religious belief to generate civil
dissension and civil strife. And they also knew that
nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster
among religious believers of various faiths a
toleration-no, an affection-for one another
than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the
God whom they all worship and seek."o0
Of course, there is no God whom "all worship and
seek."

109

Many religions have multiple gods, or no gods.no Or,

even if they have a Supreme Being, it is not called God.'11 Not to
mention that the United States is home to an ever-growing
population of nonbelievers. 1 12 Despite this, Justice Scalia insists
on describing worship of God as a unifying practice shared by
everyone. In other words, he assumes that Judeo-Christianity is
the norm. It should be obvious that a government-sponsored
prayer that excludes millions of Americans is not unifying.
Justice Scalia takes this unstated norm further than most.
Belief in God is not just the norm for religion. It is the norm for
"American-ness." After rejecting any claim that schoolsponsored prayers to God were sectarian, Justice Scalia added:
not worship any deities. Even Muslims, who do worship a Supreme Being, generally
refer to their Supreme Being as Allah, and not God.").
107 Lee, 505 U.S. at 641-42 ("But there is simply no support for the proposition that
the officially sponsored nondenominational invocation and benediction read by
Rabbi Gutterman-with no one legally coerced to recite them-violated the
Constitution of the United States.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'0 See id at 646. Justice Scalia makes this claim more than once. See id. (lamenting
that decision as "depriv[ing] our society of that important unifying mechanism.").
109

Id.

110

See Corbin,supra note 106, at 1575.

111 See id.

In 2014, 22.8% of Americans reported that they were not affiliated with a
particular religion, with 3.1% self-identifying as atheist and another 4.0% as agnostic.
See Ten FactsAbout Atheism, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 1, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01 / 10-facts-about-atheists/.
112
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"To the contrary, they are so characteristically American they
could have come from the pen of George Washington or
Abraham Lincoln himself."11 3 In short, to be American is to
believe in God.
B. Invisibility ofPrivilege
One of the hallmarks of white privilege is that white
people do not even realize that whiteness serves as the default
norm. Consequently, the (oblivious) privileged believe that their
perspective is the only, and therefore the definitive one, rather
than one of many. At the same time, the privileged never learn,
because they never need to learn, other points of view. Justice
Scalia seemed to share this trait. Consequently, Justice Scalia
regularly assumed his perspective was universal and objective,
unaware or disregarding views and information to the contrary.
Justice Scalia's exchange with the ALCU attorney in
Salazar v. Buono reveals this blind spot.114 Justice Scalia's claim
that the Latin cross is a common symbol used to honor the dead
reflects a Christian perspective, not a universal perspective. The
ACLU attorney made this clear when he pointed out that Jews
never use a Latin cross on their graves or memorials."' Despite
the laughter that followed, Justice Scalia remained adamant,
insisting on his vision of the cross as a universal symbol of
reverence.
This same insistence that his perspective is the universal
perspective appears in Justice Scalia's analysis of the Ten
Commandments. During oral argument, Professor Chemerinsky
explained to the Court, first, that the Ten Commandments were
not sacred for all religions, not even for all the Abrahamic
ones, and, second, that different faith traditions have different
versions of the Ten Commandments.1 1 7 For example, unlike the
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 642.
See SalazarTranscript, supra note 90, at 38-39.
115 See SalazarTranscript, supra note 90,
at 38-39.
"6 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(No. 03-1500) ("JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought Muslims accept the Ten
Commandments. MR. CHEMERINSKY: No, Your Honor, the Muslims do not
accept the sacred nature of the Ten Commandments, nor do Hindus, or those who
believe in many gods, nor of course, do atheists.").
117 See id. at 15-16 ("MR. CHEMERINSKY: ...
And for that matter, Your Honor, if
a Jewish individual would walk by this Ten Commandments, and see that the first
113

114
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Ten Commandments at issue in two Supreme Court cases,"' the
Jewish Ten Commandments generally starts with full text of
Exodus 20:2, acknowledging that God led the Jews out of slavery
into freedom.119 Indeed, the retelling of Exodus is at the heart of
Passover, one of the most important Jewish holidays. In short,
the challenged Ten Commandments were Christian, not
Jewish. 120 As a result, a state-sponsored Ten Commandments
display will inevitably play favorites even among religions whose
texts refer to the Decalogue. Justice Scalia summarized the
argument in a footnote:
Because there are interpretational differences
between faiths and within faiths concerning the
meaning and perhaps even the text of the
commandment isn't the Jewish version, I am the Lord, thy God, took you out of
Egypt, out of slavery, would realize it's not his or her government either."). Cf Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717-18 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There are
many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and
even different denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned
observer, these differences may be of enormous religious significance."); Paul
Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the CourthouseLawn and Elsewhere, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1477, 1479 (2005) ("[Any display of the Commandments is
inherently sectarian, because it must choose a translation, ordering, and numbering
system that will favor, or endorse one or more religions, and therefore disfavor other
religions.").
"' The version upheld in Van Orden v. Perry, which mirrors the one struck down in
McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005), was as follows:
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon
the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor
his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 707 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 See THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 539 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981) ("I
the lord am your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of
bondage."). Moreover, Orthodox Jews do not spell out God, writing G-d instead.
Finally, these first ten commandments are only a few of the 613 Jewish
commandments, all of which are equally important. And this summary itself likely
glosses over theological disputes within the Jewish community.
120 In fact, the Ten Commandments at issue may represented a Protestant
version,
not just a Christian version. Catholic Ten Commandments do not include a separate
prohibition against graven images. See generally Finkelman, supra note 117.
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Commandments, Justice STEVENS maintains that
any display of the text of the Ten Commandments
is impermissible because it "invariably places the
[government] at the center of a serious sectarian

dispute."121
Justice Scalia outright rejected this claim. His response to
the point that any version of the Ten Commandments will
inevitably favor some religious traditions was resounding: "I
think not. The sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not
widely known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even
aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal
consequences (I certainly was not)."12 2 In other words, if he did
not know about or think it was important, then no one would.
His perspective was the universal one. Even when confronted
with people telling him that, in fact, there are other perspectives,
he refused to give them weight.
Of course, even if the government-sponsored Ten
Commandments did not favor Christianity over Judaism and
Islam, they still favored the Abrahamic faith tradition over all
others.123 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia steadfastly maintained that
the Ten Commandments were nonsectarian.
Nor is it the case that a solo display of the Ten
Commandments advances any one faith. They are
assuredly a religious symbol, but they are not so
closely associated with a single religious belief that
their display can reasonably be understood as
preferring one religious sect over another. The Ten
Commandments are recognized by Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam alike as divinely given.124
To Justice Scalia, all non-Abrahamic believers, as well as
nonbelievers, either do not exist or do not matter. They are not
See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 909 n.12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
123 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 719
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if,
however, the message of the monument, despite the inscribed text, fairly could be
said to represent the belief system of all Judeo-Christians, it would still run afoul of
the Establishment Clause by prescribing a compelled code of conduct from one God,
namely a Judeo-Christian God, that is rejected by prominent polytheistic sects, such
as Hinduism, as well as nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism.").
124 McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 909 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
121
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on his radar, and therefore, they need not be taken into
consideration.
This disregard also explains Justice Scalia's claim that the
government's preference for Christianity (dressed up JudeoChristianity) is inevitable. Justice Scalia argued that:
If religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in
the public forum at all. One cannot say the word
"God," or "the Almighty," one cannot offer
public supplication or thanksgiving, without
contradicting the beliefs of some people that there
are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no
attention to human affairs. 125
Of course, Justice Scalia was quite right that a truly
nonsectarian prayer does not exist. 126 According to Justice
Scalia, because nonsectarian prayers are impossible, then the
next best thing is a prayer to God. He did not consider the more
obvious solution-or at least obvious to those who do not share
his blinkered privileged perspective-which is that if it is
impossible for the government to pray in a way that does not
exclude some citizens, it should simply refrain from praying. 1 27
C. ChristianFragility

Just as white privilege breeds white fragility, Christian
privilege breeds Christian fragility. Justice Scalia was not
immune. Because Christians are used to thinking that their
Christian perspective is universal and that their privileged status
is normal, "even a minimum amount of [religious] stress
becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves. "128
One of those defensive moves used by Justice Scalia is to position
125

Id. at 893.
Even among monotheistic religions a non-denominational prayer would be a
challenge. Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School PrayerAmendment, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 823, 829 (1983) ("[Tlhe very concept of a 'nondenominational prayer' is selfcontradictory. There are well over fifty different theistic sects in the United States,
each of which has its own tenets regarding the appropriate nature and manner of
prayer.").
127 This, however, would mean Christians would lose the privilege of having the
government sponsor prayer in their faith tradition.
128 Diangelo, supra note
54, at 54.
126
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Christians as victims. At the same time that Justice Scalia centers
and inflates the harm to Christians, he marginalizes and
downplays the harm to everyone else, allowing him to create
false equivalencies.
As with white fragility, a defining characteristic of
Christian fragility is getting easily and overly upset when one's
privilege is highlighted. For example, in the exchange about the
Latin cross, Justice Scalia decried as "outrageous" the
unremarkable argument that a Latin cross is not really the way
to honor non-Christians: "I don't think you can leap from that to
the conclusion that the only war dead that that cross honors are
the Christian war dead. I think that's an outrageous
conclusion." 12 9 Justice Scalia also overreacted when defending a
government-sponsored
Ten Commandments monument,
declaring, "[i]f religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public
forum at all." 130 The claim was pure hyperbole. There is no risk
of religion disappearing from the public forum. The
Establishment Clause only applies to government religious
speech; private religious speech is constitutionally protected, as
a string of Supreme Court cases makes clear.131
Justice Scalia's tendency to describe any attempt to
eliminate Christian privilege as hostility to Christianity
illustrates another hallmark of fragility. Thus, for example, when
the Supreme Court held that two Kentucky counties could not
post the Ten Commandments in their respective county
courthouses, Justice Scalia complained, "[t]oday's opinion . .
ratchet[s] up the Court's hostility to religion."132 Note that, in the
tradition of insisting one's perspective is the universal
See SalazarTranscript, supra note 90, at 39.
McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (school could not
exclude religious viewpoint from public forum); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (same); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (same); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (same).
132 See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 900 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 749 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Justice S[tevens]' statement is less a legal analysis than a manifesto of
secularism. It surpasses mere rejection of accommodation, and announces a positive
hostility to religion-which, unlike all other noncriminal values, the State must not
assist parents in transmitting to their offspring.").
129

130
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perspective, Justice Scalia equated religion with Christianity.13 3
While Christians may interpret the removal of the government's
Ten Commandments as an attack on their religion, Hindus,
Buddhists, Sikhs, and countless others are unlikely to interpret it
as an attack on theirs. On the contrary, one of the foundational
principles behind the Establishment Clause's separation of
church and state is that all religions flourish best when none is
singled out for special government favor. Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia viewed the Court's refusal to privilege Christianity as an
attack, rather than a move towards equality for all religions. 13 4
Another tactic of the privileged that Justice Scalia
employed is to center the privileged group and their concerns, as
displayed by his comments during the Town of Greece v.
Galloway" oral argument. Each month, the town of Greece
would invite a member of the clergy-the "chaplain for the
month"-to give a prayer before the start of the town's monthly
board meetings.13 6 The vast majority of chaplains were
Christians and most of the prayers were explicitly Christian.13 7
As a consequence, non-Christians who were petitioning the
government (for a zoning variance for example) faced the
Hobson's choice of either joining in a prayer that was contrary
to their beliefs or risk angering the demonstrably religious Town
Board.138 Justice Scalia argues:

There is a serious religious interest on the other
side of this thing that -- that -- that people who
have religious beliefs ought to be able to invoke the
133 This example, like many before and after it, could be used to illustrate more than
one point, as they are intertwined and interrelated.
134 This same impulse explains the so-called "War on Christmas." After
years of

ignoring all the non-Christians who do not celebrate Christmas, it became standard
to wish people "Happy Holidays" instead of "Merry Christmas" during the "holiday
season." In a sign of Christian fragility, this move towards inclusiveness was soon
depicted as an attack on Christians and Christmas. See, e.g., Jordan Lorence, Three
Reasons Why the New York Times' War on ChristmasDenial is Wrong, Fox NEWS (Dec.
22, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/12/22/three-reasons-why-newyork-times-war-on-christmas-denial-is-all-wrong.html (" [B] usinesses, feeling that
social pressure, began ordering their workers to say 'Happy Holidays' rather than
'Merry Christmas."'). As one commentator noted, the author "is confusing equality
with persecution." Id.
135 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014).
136 Id. at 1816.
137

Id

138

See id. at 1817-18.
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deity when they are acting as citizens, and not -not as judges or as experts in -- in the executive

branch. 139
In other words, deploying a common defense mechanism of the
fragile, he shifts the attention back onto the privileged group, in
this case the Christians who compose the government.140
Similarly, in his Lee v. Weisman.' dissent, rather than
empathize with the young students who might feel coerced into
participating in the state's sponsored prayers, Justice Scalia
chastises them for failing to exhibit sufficient respect for other
people's (Judeo-Christian) religious beliefs: "I may add,
moreover, that maintaining respect for the religious observances
of others is a fundamental civic virtue that government
(including the public schools) can and should cultivate." 14 2 If
respecting the state-sponsored (Judeo-Christian) religion leads
observers to think that students are joining in a prayer that
contradicts their own beliefs, well, so be it: "Even if it were the
case that the displaying of such respect might be mistaken for
taking part in the prayer, I would deny that the dissenter's
interest in avoiding even the false appearance of participation
constitutionally trumps the government's interest in fostering
respect for religion generally."14 3 For Justice Scalia, that was an
acceptable cost.
This willingness to force the minority members of nonprivileged religions to conform to or at least defer to the
privileged majority reappears during the Van Orden v. Perry oral
argument regarding Texas's granite Ten Commandments
monument. At one point, Justice Scalia commented:
I mean, we're a tolerant society religiously, but just
as the majority has to be tolerant of minority views
in matters of religion, it seems to me the minority
139 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811
(2014) (No. 12-696).
140 And employing another common tactic, see infra note 80-83
and accompanying

text, Justice Scalia advances a false equivalency, in this case claiming that the right of
government officials to pray while they govern is equivalent to the rights of citizens
petitioning their government to be free from government-sponsored sectarian
prayers.
141 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
142 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
143 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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has to be tolerant of the majority's ability to
express its belief that government comes from
God, which is what this is about. As Justice
Kennedy said, turn your eyes away if it's such a
big deal to you. 144
Justice Scalia basically argued that in return for the majority
tolerating the mere existence of minority religions-as though
freedom of belief were not a fundamental principle of our
country and required by the Constitution-the minority should
stop complaining when the majority has the power to make the
government endorse Christian (Judeo-Christian?) beliefs. In
other words, Christian fragility recasts the constitutional
requirement of religious liberty for all as "the majority tolerating
minority views," and the privilege of government advocating
Christian beliefs as "the minority tolerating majority views."
And the privileged cherry-on-top is the dismissive coda-if the
minority do not like seeing the majority's privilege in action, they
should just close their eyes.
As is perhaps evident from these Justice Scalia excerpts,
the flip side of the privileged's tendency to see everything from
their own perspective is the inability to see from others'
perspectives. Thus, while Justice Scalia well understood and
sympathized with the Christian point of view, he was indifferent
to others' point of view. As far as Justice Scalia was concerned,
as long as the government does not legally require someone to
participate in a religious exercise, the only harm government
sponsored prayers or displays causes is "offense," and the
Constitution is not meant to protect offended sensibilities. "[A]n
Establishment Clause violation is not made out any time a
person experiences a sense of affront from the expression of
contrary religious views. 145 Thus, in response to the Seventh
Circuit ruling that a public high school could not hold its
graduation ceremony in a church, he groused:
At most, respondents complain that they took
offense at being in a religious place. See 687 F.3d,
14 Transcript of Oral Argument, Van Orden v. Perry, supra note 116, at 17.
145 Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S.
Ct. 2283, 2284-85 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (quoting Town of Greecewith approval).
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at 848 (plaintiffs asserted that they 'felt
uncomfortable, upset, offended, unwelcome,
and/or angry' because of the religious setting' of
the graduations). Were there any question before,
Town of Greece made obvious that this is
insufficient to state an Establishment Clause
violation. 146
This privileged perspective meant that first, although
Justice Scalia did not dispute that the government may not
compel participation in government sponsored religious
practices, he limited unconstitutional coercion to coercion by
force of law. Justice Scalia could not imagine, nor even tried to
imagine, what it might feel like to be the sole Muslim or sole
Buddhist in a school of Christians, and have your government
ask you, during your school graduation, to stand and pray to a
God not your own when everyone around you is participating.
He rejected out of hand the idea that students might be
compelled to participate not from the pressure of a government
fine, but from the pressure of social ostracism.
Second, this privileged perspective made Justice Scalia
unsympathetic to any other harm besides coercion. He failed to
consider that government endorsement of one or some faiths
makes second-class citizens of those whose do not share those
faiths. From the time of James Madison, proponents of a
separation of church and state have explained that even apart
from coercion, state-sponsored religion "degrades from the equal
rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend
to those of the Legislative authority." 147 Justice O'Connor
captured the idea in her endorsement test, arguing that statesponsored religion "sends a message to non-adherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community."148 Christian
privilege is not just that Justice Scalia ignored all these potential
146

Id. at 2285.

James Madison, Memorial andRemonstrance AgainstReligious Assessments, [C.A. 20
June] 1785, NAT'L ARCHIVES (July 12, 2016),
147

http://founders.archives.gov/documents/madison/0 1-08-02-0163.
148 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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harms, it is that Justice Scalia had the nerve to scold religious
minorities for asking that their government not treat them like
second-class citizens. 149
The combination of overvaluing the harm to the
privileged Christians and undervaluing the harm the nonprivileged non-Christians leads to false equivalencies. Justice
Scalia's quotation above about minority and majority religions
tolerating each other in Van Orden v. Perry is one example.
Another is his claim to equal competing interests in response to
Justice Stevens's fear in the other Decalogue case that the
government's religious favoritism will marginalizing religious
minorities:"o

Justice STEVENS fails to recognize that in the
context of public acknowledgments of God there
are legitimate competing interests: On the one

hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling
'excluded'; but on the other, the interest of the
overwhelming majority of religious believers in
being able to give God thanks and supplication as
a people, and with respect to our national
endeavors."'
Despite Justice Scalia's concern about thwarting the Christian
majority's desire to give thanks as a people, 15 2 nothing prevents
them from doing so. What they really want is for the government

Of course, the irony of Justice Scalia dismissing the minority's complaints as mere
oversensitivity is that oversensitivity is a defining characteristic of privileged fragility.
150 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 899 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)
("Finally, I must respond to Justice STEVENS' assertion that I would 'marginaliz[e]
the belief systems of more than 7 million Americans' who adhere to religions that are
not monotheistic."). Notably, Justice Scalia did not include the millions of
Americans who do not adhere to any religion at all. (In 2007, when there were more
than 227 million adults in the United States, Total Populationby Child andAdult
149

Populations, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. (Aug. 2016),

http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/99-total-population-by-child-andadult#detailed/1/any/false/18,17,16/39,40,41/416,417, roughly 4% of Americans
identified as atheist or agnostic, Michael Lipka, A CloserLook at America's Rapidly
GrowingNones, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 13, 2015),

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/13/a-closer-look-at-americasrapidly-growing-religious-nones/. Those numbers would yield approximately nine
million atheists & agnostics).
151 McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 900.
152 Recall that the Ten Commandments at issue is the Christian version. See
supra
notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
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to give thanks in accordance with their religious beliefs.
However, giving thanks or otherwise practicing one's faith
without government participation is not really a harm, never
mind one of constitutional magnitude. Indeed, it is the status quo
for most religious minorities. Meanwhile, the actual
constitutional harm of a caste system based on religious belief is
reduced by Justice Scalia to hurt feelings.
In sum, when Christianity's privileged position was
challenged, Justice Scalia's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
displayed many characteristics of white fragility. He professed
outrage. He focused on how change will affect Christians, rather
than how the status quo affects non-Christians. Finally, by
exaggerating the harm to the already privileged while trivializing
the harm to the non-privileged, he created false equivalencies
that helped him justify maintaining the status quo, and
Christians' privileged status within it.
D. Originalismas a Theory of the Privileged
In closing, I want to suggest that Justice Scalia's
originalist approach to the Constitution was itself privilege in
action. While originalism does not neatly map onto white
privilege, it does share with it the false claim to objectivity and
the tendency to reinforce a status quo that favors the privileged.
As an initial matter, a theory of constitutional
interpretation where the scope of constitutional protection is
pinned to a time rife with hierarchies based on race, religion, sex,
etc., is likely more appealing to those who have historically been
privileged along these dimensions.1 53 For the privileged,

153 Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Onginalism: Clarence Thomas at the
Rubicon, 16 LAw & INEQ. 429, 483-84 (1998) ("[Olriginalism perpetuates racism by
taking race into account in the wrong way: it actually reflects and places primary
emphasis on the Framers' white supremacist racism."); James W. Fox Jr.,
CounterpublicOriginalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L. REv. 675, 686 (2016)
("[O1riginalism privilege[s] meanings from a racist (and sexist) age .... "). Cf Daniel
A. Farber, A FatalLoss ofBalance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 13 (2011) ("If
Dred Scott was correct on originalist grounds, originalism looks morally questionable
at least when the original understanding is tied up with earlier prejudices such as
racism and sexism.").
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adopting a constitutional theory that reinforces their privileged
position may well be a feature and not a bug. 154
Justice Scalia would have argued that he espoused
originalism not because it benefits the privileged but because it
curtails judicial discretion. Without it, judges could impose their
own personal preferences onto constitutional law. Instead,
originalism forces judges to interpret the constitutional by relying
on something objective, namely the original understanding or
original public meaning. It just so happens that in the case of the
Establishment Clause, originalism yields a doctrine that
countenances government sponsored Judeo-Christianity.
But this claim to objective constitutional interpretation is
as spurious as whites' claim that their perspective is objective."'
A full account, which would include the many different theories
of originalism that originalists may choose from,"' as well as the
indeterminancy of history,15 7 is beyond the scope of this Essay,
154 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are OriginalistConstitutionalTheories Principled, orAre They
Rationalizationsfor Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 6 (2011)
("Suspicions of rationalization are also in order insofar as originalists maintain that
the case for adopting an originalist theory is entirely independent of the theory's
conservative valence.").
155 Peter J. Smith, Sources ofFederalism:An EmpiricalAnalysis ofthe Court's Questfor
OriginalMeaning, 52 UCLA L. REv. 217, 279 (2004) ("The results of the study
suggest that one of the principal justifications for originalism-that it will constrain
the ability of judges to impose their own views in the course of decisionmakingmight not be accurate as a descriptive matter."); see also id. at 284 ("[T]he results of
the study suggest not only that the originalist's object is illusory, but also that
originalism's advantage over other approaches to constitutional interpretation with
respect to its ability to constrain judicial discretion is marginal.").
15' For a list of these theories, see Fallon, supra note 154, at 7 ("The various originalist
theories differ from each other along at least four dimensions, involving: (1) the
historical object or phenomenon that originalist judges or scholars should seek to
identify-the Framers' intent, the original understanding of a specified group of
lawmakers, or the original public meaning of constitutional language; (2) the
conclusiveness of originally expected applications of constitutional language in fixing
the Framers' intent, the original understanding, or the original public meaning; (3)
the degree of determinacy with which historical sources can be expected to fix
historical meaning and the role of judges in cases of relative indeterminacy; and (4)
the circumstances, if any, under which non-historical considerations such as stare
decisis, prudence, and apprehensions of normative desirability can justify
constitutional decisions other than those that a purely historical criterion of
constitutional meaning would mandate.").
157 Often there is no fixed "general understanding" or "public meaning" waiting to be
discovered. Thus, the claim to determinancy is illusory. See Suzanna Sherry, The
Indeterminacy ofHistoricalEvidence,19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 437, 437 (1996) ("I
view my task in this Article to be proving that history is indeterminate."); Or Bassok,
The Sociological-LegitimacyDifficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 264-65 (2011) ("Critics of
originalism argue that this pretense of objectivity, determinacy, and constraint is
unrealistic, considering the highly indeterminate and relativistic nature of history as a
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but I will mention two reasons. First, Justice Scalia did not
always apply an originalist theory."' He was adamant about its
necessity for the Establishment Clause, and would have
overruled established precedent to do so.159 In contrast, he did
not mention originalism, or deferred to precedent, in other areas.
For example, he never acknowledged in affirmative action cases
"evidence suggesting that the Framers and ratifiers of the Equal
Protection Clause did not expect it to be applied to bar race-based
programs for the benefit of racial minorities."'6 0 In fact, Justice
Scalia's use of originalism was so inconsistent some scholars
have concluded that he was not really an originalist.16 1
Second, when Justice Scalia did rely on an originalist
approach, the strictness with which he applied it varied.162 For
example, when interpreting the Second Amendment, he rejected
discipline, which exposes originalism to the same failing it set out to correct."); see,
e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (both majority and dissent
apply an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation yet come to opposite
conclusions); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Justices in the majority and
dissent come to different conclusions regarding founding era view of government
prayers to or invocations of God).
15' Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the EstablishmentClause, 103 Nw. U.L.
REv. 727, 729 (2009) ("As others have noted, the 'originalist' Justices are only
opportunistically originalist. When original meaning does not support the result they
want to reach, they tend to ignore it .... ).
159 Justice Scalia has long argued that the touchstone for Establishment Clause
should be history and tradition and not the existing Lemon test or endorsement test.
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (advocating for Establishment Clause
jurisprudence based on history and tradition); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (insulting Lemon
test by comparing it to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried"); Elmbrook
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2283-84 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
the endorsement test as an "errant line of precedent").
160 Fallon, supra note 154, at 17 ("In United States v. Virginia, for example, Justice
Scalia appeared to maintain that the Equal Protection Clause did not and could not
bar gender-based exclusions from the Virginia Military Institute because the Equal
Protection Clause was not originally understood as applicable to gender-based
exclusions from public colleges and universities. By contrast, in cases involving racebased admissions preferences at public universities, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
felt no need to grapple with evidence suggesting that the Framers and ratifiers of the
Equal Protection Clause did not expect it to be applied to bar race-based programs
for the benefit of racial minorities.").
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia'sInfidelity: A Critiqueof"Faint-Hearted"
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 7, 13 (2006) ("Justice Scalia is simply not an
161

originalist. Whatever virtues he attributes to originalism, he leaves himself not one
but three different routes by which to escape adhering to the original meaning of the
text. These are more than enough to allow him, or any judge, to reach any result he
wishes.").
162 My description of strictness corresponds to Fallon's second dimension. See Fallon,
supra note 154.
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as "frivolous" the idea that the Second Amendment protects only
the guns that existed at the time of the founding.163 Because the
types of guns have significantly changed, so should the scope of
the Second Amendment. 16 4 When interpreting the scope of the
Establishment Clause, however, Justice Scalia maintained that
the government prayers to God that existed at the time of
founding are still perfectly constitutional.16 5 Yet prayers that
might have been considered constitutional at the founding
because they captured everyone's beliefs no longer do because of
significant changes in the country's religious composition.' We
are, after all, "a vastly more diverse people than were our
forefathers." 16 7 But, although Justice Scalia insisted that the
originalist interpretation must take into account changes in the
country's gun composition, he rejected the argument that the
originalist interpretation must take into account changes in the
country's religious composition.'
Thus, even though Justice Scalia claimed that originalism
curtailed his discretion, and that his conclusions were the result
of objective decision-making, they were not. 169 1 am not arguing
that Justice Scalia intentionally exploited originalism's
indeterminacy in order to achieve his desired outcome all while
declaring his personal preferences played no role.170 After all,

.

163 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) ("Some have made the
argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th
century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional
rights that way.").
164 Id. at 582 ("Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of
communications, e.g, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 ...
(1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g, Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36 ... (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in
existence at the time of the founding.").
15 See supra Part
I.
166 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 817 (1983) ("[Olur religious composition
makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers . . . . In the face of
such profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable to no one in
the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons .

Id.
See supra PartI.
169 McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 908 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]
limitless number of subjective judgments may be smuggled into his [Scalia's]
historical analysis. Worse, they may be buried in the analysis.").
170 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DuKE L.J. 239, 247
(2009) ("[Olriginalists can and often do move from one version of originalism to
another as they decide different issues, thus allowing them to reach results that they
167

161
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many whites truly believe that their conclusions about raceconclusions that confirm their privileged status-are the result of
objective decision-making too. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's
originalism allowed him to claim objectivity while safeguarding
Christianity's privileged status.
CONCLUSION

Several characteristics of privilege-unstated norms,
invisibility, fragility-permeated Justice Scalia's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Professor DiAngelo has noted that "if
whites cannot engage with an exploration of alternative racial
perspectives, they can only reinscribe white perspectives as
universal."17 1 In a similar way, Justice Scalia's insistence on
originalism, with its questionable claim to objectivity, merely
reinscribed Christian privilege.

personally prefer, all the while claiming (and likely mistakenly believing) that they
are being guided by nothing more than the external constraint of history.").
...
DiAngelo, supra note 54, at 66.

